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Should the Victims' Rights Movement Have Influence Over
Criminal Law Formulation and Adjudication?
Paul H. Robinson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The victims' rights movement has become increasingly influential in setting
criminal justice policy. What can be said about where its influence should be
heeded, and where it should not? With regard to substantive criminal law in
particular, should the victims' rights movement have influence over its formulation
and adjudication? The short answer, on which I will elaborate below, is that it
ought to have influence over criminal law formulation but not necessarily over
criminal law adjudication. It ought to have influence over criminal law formulation
because there is great benefit in formulations that track shared lay intuitions of
justice, and the victims' rights movement is the dominant organization of lay
persons involved in criminal justice reform. Victims' rights organizations ought
to have limited influence over adjudication-and individual victims ought to
have no influence-because an offender's liability and punishment ought to
depend upon his blameworthiness (including, primarily, the seriousness of his
offense) not on his good or bad luck as to the forgiving or vindictive nature of his
victim.
II. THE UTILITY OF HAVING CRIMINAL LAW RULES TRACK
LAY INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE
The criminal law should care about lay persons' intuitions of justice because
such concern is essential to effective crime control.' More than because of the
threat of legal punishment, people obey the law because they fear the disapproval
of their social group if they violate the law, and because they generally see
themselves as moral beings who want to do the right thing as they perceive it.
The normative pressures coming from other people, generally experienced as
an external force by the actor, function like the more formal deterrence
mechanisms were thought to function. People obey the social norms of their
groups because those groups have rewards to give for doing so and sanctions for
failing to do so. Three classes of "informal sanctions" are usually identified and
can be incurred when one's group judges that one has transgressed: "commitment
costs," in which past accomplishments are in jeopardy; "attachment costs,"
involving the loss of valued relationships with others; and "stigma," discreditation in
the eyes of others. These sanctions may follow arrest for a crime, but if the harm-
* Edna & Ednyfed Williams Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. Part II of this essay condenses the points made in Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
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doing act becomes known or suspected within one's community, even if one does
not get arrested, informal sanctioning processes may occur. The social costs to
the offender may extend beyond the offender's friends and family. If one is
thought to have committed a crime, one may lose one's job, ability to borrow
2
money, ability to command trust from others, and possibly business partners.
People's own moral rules and action-proscriptions are generally experienced
as internal forces; people recognize that they come from the moral rules that they
have adopted. Phenomenologically, we all have experienced this sense of obligation
to act in a certain way, to avoid harm to another or to fulfill some commitment
we have made.
These two barriers to deviant behavior-social sanctions and internal moral
obligations-are analytically and often experientially separable, but in the long
term they converge. Children are trained by a powerful socialization process into
internalizing the beliefs represented in the social norms of the culture to which
they belong. People come to hold the moral standards of the cultures in which
they are raised; internal moral standards and external norms generally label the
same actions as right or as wrong.
What is the evidence concerning crime prevention due to fear of social
sanction or fulfillment of moral obligation? Harold Grasmick and his associates
have done the most sustained work documenting the role of the informal
determinants of law-abidingness. Their research consistently finds that both
fear of social disapproval and moral commitment to the law inhibit the
commission of illegal activity.3 They comment that their "findings highlight the
importance of internal control in producing conformity to the law."4 Other
researchers reach similar conclusions. Paternoster and lovanni conclude that "the
greatest effects on delinquent involvement are those from informal forces of
social control."5 Meier and Johnson conclude that "despite contemporary
predisposition toward the importance of legal sanctions, [their] findings
are ... consistent with the accumulated literature concerning the primacy of
interpersonal influence" over legal sanctions.6 Tyler's review of existing studies
concludes that "testing the ability of each of the attitudinal factors ... to predict
2. Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical
Review, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 545, 564-66 (1986); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive
Effects of the Perceived Risk ofArrest: Testing an Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561,
562 (1991). For an examination of the effect of criminal conviction on an offender's future earning potential,
see John R. Lott, Jr., An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The
Importance of an Individual's Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 167-77 (1992); John R. Lott, Jr., Do We
Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583, 584 (1992).
3. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization
as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980).
4. Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice:
Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 837, 854 (1990).
5. Raymond Paternoster & Leeann lovanni, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity: A Reexamination,
64 Soc. FORCES 751, 769 (1986).
6. Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal
Production of Conformity, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 302 (1977).
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variance in compliance ... [t]he most important incremental contribution is made
by personal morality,. ..
The evidence reviewed suggests that the influences of social group sanctions
and internalized norms are the most powerful determinants of conduct, more
significant than the threat of deterrent legal sanctions. But the law is not
irrelevant to the operation of these powerful forces. Criminal law, in particular,
can influence the norms that are held by the social group and internalized by the
individual. Criminal law's influence comes from being a societal mechanism
through which the force of social norms is realized and by which the force of
internal moral principles is strengthened. That is, the law has little independent
force, the way social group norms and internalized norms do. It has power to the
extent that it can amplify, sustain, and shape these two power sources. It has
power to the extent that it influences what the social group thinks and what its
members internalize.
A. The Criminal Law's Compliance Power as a Moral Authority in
Unanalyzed Cases
One effect the criminal law has in shaping conduct, specifically in gaining
compliance with its demands, is its ability to resolve ambiguity as to the
wrongfulness of the contemplated conduct. If it has developed a reputation as a
reliable statement of existing norms, people will be willing to defer to its moral
authority in cases where there exists some ambiguity.
There is evidence, largely collected and analyzed by Tyler, that people are
inclined to accept the law as a source of moral authority that they themselves
should take seriously.8 This is referred to in social science as informational
influence-influence produced by the information transmitted by a specific
institution, in which one accepts the validity of the definition of right and wrong
behavior conveyed by that institution, internalizes that definition, and expects
other people to have internalized it as well. Tyler reviews the literature that
relates a person's belief that a law reflects a valid moral rule to obedience to that
law and finds them to be quite strongly related. 9 He notes:
This high level of normative commitment to obeying the law offers an
important basis for the effective exercise of authority by legal officials.
People clearly have a strong predisposition toward following the law. If
7. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 60 (1990).
8. Id. at 25.
9. Id. at 37.
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authorities can tap into such feelings, their decisions will be more widely
followed. 1°
Tyler reviews a number of studies that suggest the level of commitment to
obey the law is proportional to what Tyler calls the law's perceived "legitimacy,"
by which he means a community's perceptions that, first, the law instantiates
their moral beliefs, and, second, that the law came into being via fair procedures
conducted by the appropriate authorities." Tyler reasons that, if one regards the
law as a legitimate source of rules, if it has what John Darley and I have called
"moral credibility," then one should be more likely to regard the law's judgments
about right and wrong as an influential fact in one's own moral thinking; in turn,
one should be more likely to obey the law.'2 Further, one should be more likely
to support the authorities that promulgated the law. To test this contention Tyler
reviews a number of studies that examine individual differences in perceptions of
the law's legitimacy, and relate those differences to differences in support for
legal authorities and felt obligations to obey the law.'
3
[S]ix studies.., address the question of whether feelings of [the law's]
legitimacy lead to behavioral compliance with the law and legal
authorities, regardless of whether these feelings are expressed as support
for the authorities or as an obligation to obey .... These studies suggest
that those who view authority as legitimate are more likely to comply
with legal authority, whether the legitimacy is expressed as obligation or
'4
as support ....
Also as one would expect, those who perceive the political authority that
governs them to be less legitimate are more likely to engage in acts of social or
political protest, some of which are illegal. More research on this issue is
obviously needed, but the current research supports the claim of a connection
between perceptions of the law's moral credibility and obedience to the law.' 5
10. Id. at 65. In another study, Grasmick and Green conclude: "each of the three independent variables
[of deterrence by threat of legal punishment, social disapproval, and personal moral commitment] makes a
significant, independent contribution to the explained variance [i.e., the rate of criminal behavior]." Grasmick &
Green, supra note 3, at 326.
1I. See TYLER, supra note 7, at 64-68. The specific studies noted are listed in Tables 3.1-3.3. Id. at 32-
37.
12. Id. at 37-38
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 31. Tyler suggests that the law gains legitimacy in two ways, only one of which Darley and I
emphasize in our argument. First, and the element we emphasize, the law gains legitimacy because it is seen as
in accord with the moral rules of the community. Second, it gains legitimacy because it is the product of
processes such as legislation and judicial debate, which processes that society has agreed are the appropriate
ones to enact such laws. The laws are the products of legitimate authority, in other words. We agree that
procedural fairness is an important additional element producing moral credibility for the law.
15. Notice that, as a matter of common sense, the law's moral credibility is not needed to tell a person
that murder, rape, or robbery is wrong. The criminal law's influence in this respect as a moral authority has
effect primarily at the borderline of criminal activity, where there may be some ambiguity as to whether the
conduct really is wrong.
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B. The Criminal Law's Ability to Facilitate the Shaping of Shared Norms
A second and more powerful way criminal law influences conduct is by
influencing the shaping of shared norms, thereby harnessing the powerful social
forces of normative behavior control. The norms at issue here are of a limited
sort, of course. Criminal law ought to and does have little interest in norms that
influence everyday matters of style, dress, speech, and manners. Cutting in line,
being rude, or wearing revealing clothing may be annoying to some people, but it
generally is not, and ought not be, criminal. Even if most people frowned upon
such violations of norms, the conduct ought not be criminal because it fails to
reach the level of seriousness that deserves the condemnation of criminal
liability, which is typically and properly limited to the violation of norms against
violence and dishonesty. 
16
1. The Educative Function of Criminal Law Adjudication and Legislative
Debate
Social science suggests that the criminal law builds and maintains societal
norms in several related ways. First, criminal law enforcement and adjudication
activities send daily messages to all who read or hear about them. Every time
criminal liability is imposed, it reminds us of the norm prohibiting the offender's
conduct and confirms its condemnable nature. 17 The public condemnation expressed
in reaction to the offense supports and encourages the efforts of those who have
resisted temptation and continued to remain law-abiding. Having avoided
breaking that law, people can regard themselves favorably, which in turn
reinforces their moral commitment to the norm expressed in the offense.
Further, every adjudication offers an opportunity to confirm the exact nature
of the norm or to signal a shift or refinement of it. Thus, an endangerment or
manslaughter prosecution of a polluter points out that some instances of polluting
can violate the norm against endangering others. The publicity surrounding an
adjudication can teach all people about the consequences of certain kinds of
polluting and, therefore, that it ought to be avoided. Kai Erikson's studies point
out the role of criminal law in marking the limits between allowable, although
perhaps regrettable, conduct and criminal conduct: the prosecution of a deviant
16. There are some exceptions, however. Bestiality and eating the flesh of human corpses, for example,
remain criminal because the norms against such conduct remain strongly and widely felt.
17. At the same time, regular non-enforcement or a declination to prosecute or to convict tends to
undermine the norm prohibiting the conduct, Thus, adultery may remain on the books, but a policy of not
prosecuting it takes away the criminal law's support of any norm against such conduct that may have existed.
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brands the deviant as a criminal, and casts a bright light on the exact location of a
boundary that previously might have been obscure to the community. 8
Further, people are likely to attend to the comparative liabilities that are
assigned by sentencing provisions of legal systems; people intuit that more
morally serious offenses should command greater penalties. As Cook remarks,
"[t]he legislated (and actual) severity of penalty for a particular offense may
influence the public's feeling for the seriousness or moral repugnance of this
offense."'19 In the long run, for those crimes in which "moral inhibition" plays an
important role, announcing high severity of punishment may be an important
communication-more important than ensuring high probability of punishment,
which is generally not possible.
The criminal adjudication process is not the only forum for public discussion
and announcement. Legislative proposals for criminalization, decriminalization,
or increased or decreased punishment, also provide an occasion for public debate
that can help build norms, with the conclusion of the debate announced by
legislative action, or inaction. The public discussion about the problem of hate
speech and proposals to criminalize it, for example, help strengthen the shared
public understanding that such conduct is condemnable. When one seeks to
criminalize an act, the debate should say why that act endangers others, or
otherwise fits the case of those things we are willing to criminalize. In our
complex, interdependent society, this can be instructive. If lawmakers argue that
an act should not be criminalized, or should be decriminalized, then they should
be able to say why it does not resemble the sorts of things that are now
criminalized.
2. The Relationship Between Criminal Law and Community Norms
The claim here is only that criminal law can contribute to the formation and
change of community norms and individuals' moral reasoning; laws cannot
themselves compel community acceptance. Passing a law cannot itself create a
norm, and not passing a law against certain conduct cannot make that conduct
morally acceptable to the community. The passage and subsequent failure of
National Prohibition shows the law's limited ability to change norms even when
the change is supported by a significant portion of the public. 20 The law is, rather,
a vehicle by which the community debates, tests, and ultimately settles upon and
expresses its norms. The passage of criminal legislation more often reflects a
critical level of support for an incipient norm. The act of criminalization sometimes
nurtures the norm, as does faithful enforcement and prosecution, and over time
18. KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 11 (1966).
19. Philip J. Cook, Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventative
Effects of Punishment, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164, 177 (1977).
20. In December of 1933, the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment was completed by the adoption of
the Twenty-First Amendment. It was, "[i]n hindsight... the logical outcome of a foolish, unpopular reform."
DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 3 (Kent State Univ. Press 2000).
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the community view may mature into a strong consensus. The criminal law is not
an independent player in that process, but rather is a contributing mechanism by
which the norm-nurturing process moves forward.
We have seen the process at work recently in enhancing prohibitory norms
against sexual harassment, hate speech, drunk driving, and domestic violence. It
also has been at work in diluting existing norms against homosexual conduct,
fornication, and adultery. While it is difficult to untangle how much the criminal
law reform followed and how much it led these shifts, it seems difficult to
imagine that these changes could have occurred without the recognition and
confirmation that comes through changes in criminal law legislation, enforcement,
and adjudication.
Perhaps more than any other society, ours relies on the criminal law for
norm-nurturing. Our greater cultural diversity means that we cannot expect a
stable pre-existing consensus on the contours of condemnable conduct that is
found in more homogeneous societies. We require more public debate and
discussion to reconcile conflicting views and more public education on the
refinements and consensuses that result. Unlike many other societies, we share
no religion or other arbiter of morality that might perform this role. Our criminal
law is, for us, the place we express our shared beliefs of what is truly condemnable.
That challenge for criminal law also gives it a potential power. A criminal
law that earns a reputation of moral credibility can influence the shaping of
norms and, through them, conduct. But to become a moral authority, the criminal
law cannot deviate too far from what the community thinks is just, that is, too far
from lay intuitions of justice. Why does the criminal law care what the layperson
thinks is just? Because it is only by heeding those views that the criminal law can
provide effective crime control.
III. THE IMPROPRIETY OF HAVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADJUDICATIONS
INFLUENCED BY THE VICTIM'S VIEWS OF PUNISHMENT
There are a variety of proposals for victim involvement in the criminal
justice process. Many are unobjectionable, even important. For example, a recent
U.S. Department of Justice report urges that victims have a right to notification
of bail, trial, parole, and related hearings; notification of offender escape or
release; restitution; notice of disposition of their victimizer's case; and notification
of these rights and standing to enforce them."1
However, other proposals for victim involvement in the criminal justice
process are problematic, in particular, those reforms that involve the victim in the
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEW DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY xii (1998).
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adjudication of the victimizer's case. Some involvement is important, indeed
central, to a just adjudication: providing information to the jury at trial or to the
judge at sentencing can be essential to understanding the nature and extent of the
harm caused.22 But providing decision-makers with information on impact is
quite different from influencing the decision-making process, and some proposals
for victim involvement go beyond the former to reach the latter. At the extreme,
for example, some would give victims a veto over plea bargains.23 A common
and somewhat more ambiguous practice is requiring prosecutors to consult with
victims before entering into a plea agreement or before making sentencing
recommendations.24 Some states give the victim a right to present to the court his
or her views on the sentence he or she wants imposed.25 What these reforms have
in common is their invitation to victims to not only give information about the
impact of the offense but to have some influence over the punishment decision.
Why should this be objectionable? Why shouldn't victims have a say in the
punishment to be imposed on their victimizer?
First, such victim influence is inconsistent with our reasons for being so
careful to have impartial judges, jurors, and prosecutors. Our notions of fairness
and justice demand that such decisions be made by impartial decision-makers
who will look only to the facts of the case and not be swayed by a personal stake
in it. We typically make it a crime for parties to influence decision-makers who
are represented to be neutral.26 Even prosecutors are commonly disqualified if
they have a personal stake in a case.27 (And American criminal justice typically
does not allow private prosecutions).28 If we think a prosecutor's personal stake
22. Many states provide and the American Bar Association supports a right to present a victim impact
statement. See MARY L. BOLAND, CRIME VICTIM'S GUIDE TO JUSTICE, 139-70 (2001) (providing a compilation
of state-by-state laws); UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 216 (1992).
23. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 193
(1995).
24. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4401-13-4415 (2001); 120 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 725 (West
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46.1841-46.1844 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-24-201-24-213
(2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1510-3-1560 (Law Co-op. 1985). Other states require prior notification of
victims of proposed plea agreements before they are presented at trial, presumably to give victims an
opportunity to argue their objections to the prosecutor before the agreement is formalized. See, e.g., CAL PENAL
CODE §§ 679.02, 679.03 (West 1999). Giving victims a right to give their views to the prosecutor on a proposed
plea agreement or to a sentencing judge on a proposed sentence is a bit of a gray area. The giving of views, it
might be argued is like giving other information that is unobjectionable. But my own view is that it is
importantly different. The giving of views on a proposed disposition is simply an attempt to influence. We
criminalize that kind of partisan attempt at influence in other contexts-such as a party trying to influence a
juror-why would it be different here?
25. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.61.010-12.61.030 (Michie 1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4401-13-
4415; KY. REV. STAT. §§ 421.500-421.550 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6101 (West
Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-34-.01-12.1-34-.05 (Michie 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2930.01-2930.19 (Anderson 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-28-1-12-28-10 (Michie 2000); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-28C-I-23A-28C-5 (Michie 1998).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3815 (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-55 (Michie 1972); MO. STAT.
§ 575.260 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-460 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2002).
27. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-
1.3 (3d ed. 1993).
28. Id. § 3-2.1.
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in a case ought to disqualify him or her, on what grounds could we justify
allowing the most interested party-the victim-to have a veto or other influence
over the prosecutor's liability and punishment decisions?
Second, every victim deserves to have his or her offense taken equally
seriously. Both our notions of the equality of individuals and our notions of
justice demand that the murder of the homeless beggar ought to be treated as
seriously as the murder of the loved family member. The punishment in a case
ought not depend upon whether the victim happens to have a family that has the
means and the interest to actively press for greater punishment.
Third, because different victims inevitably have different views on how they
want a case handled, giving victims influence in the decision-making is to ensure
disparity in punishment among similar cases. Greater punishment is appropriate
for an offender who causes greater harm as compared to one who causes less
harm, and greater punishment is appropriate for an offender who acts
intentionally as compared to one who acts only recklessly or negligently, but
greater punishment is not appropriate simply because one victim is vindictive as
compared to another who is forgiving. Justice demands that a defendant's
liability and punishment depend upon his blameworthiness for the offense, not
upon other factors over which he has no control, such as his bad luck in having a
vindictive rather than a forgiving victim.
These objections to having victim influence in the punishment decision are
presented here as ethical objections, but they have an important practical
component as well. As Part II of this article describes, the criminal justice
system's ultimate ability to gain compliance depends in large measure upon the
moral credibility it has earned with the community. Thus, the distortions of
justice enumerated above-having punishment depend upon factors extraneous
to the offender's blameworthiness and having disparate punishment imposed
upon offenders of similar blameworthiness-undermine the system's moral
credibility and, therefore, undercuts its long-term crime control power.
Thus, even if victim participation in the punishment decision might have
beneficial effects for the victim at hand, the long-term effect of such participation
is to de-legitimize the process and to produce results inconsistent with our shared
intuitions of justice, and that hurts us all in the end. If we sympathize with this
victim, we must also sympathize with future victims and show as much concern
for their interests. Ultimately, the class of victims and potential victims will be
better served by a criminal justice process that seeks to impose the punishment
each offender deserves, no more and no less. Moreover, the natural partiality of
victims tends to distort the criminal justice process from just punishment and,
equally importantly, is seen to openly prejudice the search for impartial justice.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It's worth confirming how important victim participation in the criminal
justice process can be, including active involvement in determining the
punishment. As Fletcher argues: "The purpose of 'victim participation' is to
restore the dignity of the victim and all those affected by the crime.
29
Participation can help a victim regain a sense of security and to shed the sense of
powerlessness that victimization often produces. And as the so-called "restorative
processes" like victim-offender mediation and sentencing circles have shown,
victim participation in the disposition of a case can have beneficial effects for the
parties involved and for society generally.
30
Victim participation also can provide important oversight and accountably to
a system that historically has had little of either. Prosecutors can cut plea-
bargains for bad reasons-to save money or for political reasons-and there is
little recourse. A regular presence by victims can inspire prosecutors to avoid
questionable deals. Sentencing judges also might be kept more attentive if the
system had regular victim involvement.
But many, if not all of these benefits can be achieved by victim participation
short of influencing the punishment decision. A right to notification and presence
at hearings and a right to present all relevant information ("victim impact
statements") can provide much of the needed oversight and can inspire much
victim "restoration."
It may be possible to allow more participation than just the giving of an
impact statement. While it may be problematic to give the victim a personal say
in the punishment of his victimizer, it would not necessarily be problematic to
allow participation in that decision by a victims' organization. The organization
might help insure that prosecutors and judges will take account of the harm to the
victim in determining the extent of liability and punishment. Because the
organization sees the full range of criminal cases and kinds of victimizations that
the individual victim does not, the organization has the ability, if properly
motivated, to realistically and dispassionately assesses how the case compares to
the full range of other cases. In other words, the victims' organization can fulfill
the demand of justice that each offender be punished according to his relative
degree of blameworthiness, as compared to all other offenders and offenses.
To summarize, then, I would encourage the active participation of victims'
organizations in both the formulation and the adjudication of criminal law, but I
would discourage the participation of an individual victim in deciding the
punishment to be imposed on his or her own victimizer.
29. FLETCHER, supra note 23, at 189.
30. Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of "Restorative Justice, " UTAH L.
REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 7-10, on file with author). Such "restorative processes" can be
practiced in ways that are objectionable because they frustrate doing justice-as they often are under the
"Restorative Justice" movement-but this need not be so; they can be practiced in ways consistent with doing
justice. Id.
